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ABSTRACT
Shortly after oil production commenced in 2004, Timor-Leste became one of the most oil
dependent countries in the world. The purpose of this piece is to assess whether Timor-Leste
has been suffering from the typical political and economic ailments associated with the ‘resource
curse’ hypothesis. The study critically analyses available evidence with reference to some of the
common manifestations of the resource curse: conflict, rent-seeking behavior, Dutch disease and
revenue volatility. It confirms that all of the examined mechanisms of the resource curse are
present in Timor-Leste to varying degrees. This does not necessarily point to a causal
relationship between mineral dependence and these socio-economic problems. Many of these
problems, common amongst developing countries, are attributed to a wide array of historical
and political factors (which are likely to be associated with colonialism and inherited weak
governance structures). While it might be tempting to attribute these problems to mineral
discoveries and related income shocks, careful examination suggests that the extractive sector
exacerbates pre-existing problems than necessarily causes them.
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Shortly after oil production commenced in 2004, Timor-
Leste became one of the most oil dependent countries
in the world; 36% of its GDP stemmed from the sector
in 2017, while 83% of the state budget for 2019
derived from oil-based sources (Ministry of Finance
2018). Whilst vast oil wealth can be advantageous for a
country starting out on the path of development, propo-
nents of the ‘resource curse’ thesis claim that mineral
dependence often impedes broader socio-economic
progress in the long term. The term ‘resource curse’
was first coined by Professor Richard Auty in his 1993
seminal book Sustaining Development in Mineral Econom-
ies: The Resource Curse Thesis to indicate the paradoxical
tendency of resource-rich countries to grow more slowly
than resource-poor ones (Auty 1993). The causes and
symptoms of the resource curse have been at the
center of intensive research over the last two decades.
While academic interest was initially confined to the
economic domain, nowadays the multifaceted and
complex nature of the curse is widely acknowledged
within scholarly and policy circles – several studies
show that excessive mineral dependence is associated
not only with inferior economic outcomes (e.g.
subdued growth, loss in export competitiveness,
volatility), but also more broadly with poor performance
in several socio-political aspects (e.g. political stability,
rent-seeking, public accountability). Mineral wealth
often incentivises firms and individuals to lobby/rent-
seek by allocating own resources to capturing part of
the extractive rents (e.g. in the form of bribes, striking,
selective voting, Baggio and Papyrakis 2010). Public
accountability can also be limited within the context of
excessive mineral dependence, when politicians
(especially in authoritarian regimes) make use of
mineral rents to win political support and prolong their
stay in power (Andersen and Aslaksen 2013; Ross
2001). Another branch of the literature has linked the
availability of mineral resources with the occurrence of
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2005), especially in the
case of low-income and ethnically-fragmented societies
(Hodler 2006; Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009).
At the same time, it is widely acknowledged that the
resource curse is, by no means, an iron law – although
there is a general tendency for mineral-rich nations to
underperform in the aforementioned dimensions,
countries that had a sound institutional framework in
place prior to resource discoveries, as well as more diver-
sified economies, managed to turn the curse into a bles-
sing (as in the case of Norway [Cavalcanti, Mohaddes,
and Raissi 2011; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006]).
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Furthermore, many of the socio-economic problems of
developing countries are attributed to a wide array of
(often common) historical and political factors (which
are likely to be associated with colonialism and inherited
weak governance structures) – while it is often tempting
to attribute these problems to mineral discoveries and
related income shocks, what is more meaningful is to
assess whether the extractive sector exacerbates pre-
existing problems than necessarily causes them.
Motivated by this prior empirical evidence, our analy-
sis aims to examine whether Timor-Leste (one of the
newest sovereign states, for which little is still known in
terms of its resource management) has been experien-
cing any resource curse symptoms similar to the ones
outlined above. Our aim is to provide a critical analysis
that examines in such detail the development effects
of mineral resource management in Timor-Leste (and
whether these are necessarily attributed to poor resource
management or other socio-political and historical
factors). Our analysis contributes to the literature by
examining whether there is a ‘resource curse’ in Timor-
Leste, the mechanisms through which this might occur
and measures in place to mitigate its effects. The aim
of our study is not to develop new theoretical insights
and mechanisms but rather scrutinize how already ident-
ified socio-economic problems common to many other
mineral-dependent nations may also be applicable in
the case of Timor-Leste. We find that several of the exam-
ined mechanisms of the resource curse are present in
Timor-Leste to varying degrees.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides
a brief overview of Timor-Leste’s historical and current
context. Section 3 discusses in detail key (political and
economic) resource curse mechanisms and evidence of
their presence in the context of Timor-Leste. Section 4
concludes.
2. Timor-Leste – a brief overview
The Portuguese first settled in Timor during the sixteenth
century (before the arrival of the Dutch, who gained
control of the port town of Kupang during the mid-
seventeenth century). Initially Timor had a rather infor-
mal (and small) Portuguese presence until 1701 when
Antonio Coelho Guerreiro was appointed as the first Gov-
ernor of Timor and Solor (and it was not until the mid-
nineteenth century that Portugal attempted to build a
functioning colonial regime in East Timor) (Kammen
2019). A treaty signed in 1859 established the border
between the territories of Dutch (West) Timor and Portu-
guese (East) Timor (de Magalhaes 1992). Following the
25th of April 1974 Revolution in Portugal, the new gov-
ernment backed the right of Portuguese colonies to
self-determination, and independence was unilaterally
declared in Timor-Leste on 28 November 1975. Following
this, on 7 December 1975, Indonesia invaded Timor-
Leste and the following year declared it the 27th Indone-
sian province. This occupation, lasting until 1999, saw the
start of a long running resistance movement, and led to
the deaths of between 100,000 and 230,000 people, from
military action, starvation and disease (Burr and Evans
2001). The removal of Indonesian President Suharto in
1998 opened the door to international negotiations
regarding the fate of Timor-Leste, leading to the
Popular Consultation (independence referendum),
which took place on 30 August 1999 (Molnar 2010).
Despite increasing violence leading up to the poll, 98%
of voters turned out with 78.5% voting in favor of full
independence. This result led to widespread destruction
of infrastructure in Timor-Leste; Kingsbury estimates that
70% of buildings were destroyed, as well as water, elec-
trical, and telecommunication equipment (Kingsbury
2000). On 20 September 1999, the UN Security Council
approved an international armed peacekeeping force
INTERFET led by Australian troops – the International
Force for East Timor – to intervene, prevent further
slaughter, demobilize the militias and supervise repatria-
tion of the Indonesian military. In October of the same
year, the Security Council appointed a UN mission
UNTAET – the United Nations Transitional Administration
in East Timor – to take over, maintain law and order and
set up a transitionary administration (that lasted until full
independence was achieved on 20 May 2002 (Molnar
2010; Kammen 2019)).
Post-independence, Timor-Leste saw the beginning of
oil extraction from its Bayu-Undan field in 2004, which
doubled its GDP size (Ministry of Finance 2015). The
economy of Timor-Leste has been reliant on oil and
natural gas ever since (with the extractive sector nowa-
days accounting for more than a third of all income pro-
duced) (Ministry of Finance 2018). Inflation has also been
high in Timor-Leste with prices increasing by about 42%
between 2010 and 2017 (World Bank 2018), due to large
government expenditure financed by oil rents (Asian
Development Bank 2015). The country’s vision – as por-
trayed in the Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030 –
to create a high-income country with a diversified
economy has not materialized yet and there are real
doubts whether this idea is practically achievable (Minis-
try of Finance 2011).
Whilst the economy is reliant on oil revenues, oil-gen-
erated income from the Bayu-Undan field is projected to
drop steeply over the next few years, with the oil pro-
duction already declining and expected to cease by
2021. In order to create a sustainable source of
revenue, the government founded the Petroleum Fund
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of Timor-Leste in 2005, a sovereign wealth fund into
which petroleum rents are paid, designed to manage
oil-based resources ‘for the benefit of both current and
future generations… in a fair and equitable manner’
(Central Bank of Timor-Leste 2016, 14). The Fund,
hence, aims to support intergenerational equity (by
putting aside income for future generations) but also
perform a stabilizing role in the economy whenever
necessary (e.g. by stimulating economic activity in
periods of slower growth). The majority of the Fund’s
resources are invested in government bonds (approxi-
mately 60% is invested in US Treasury bonds and other
equities from developed economies, Doraisami 2018).
By the end of 2017, the Fund held assets of US$16.8
billion (Ministry of Finance 2017); however, withdrawals
have consistently exceeded their targeted annual levels
(i.e. the so-called Estimated Sustainable Income, that cor-
responds to 3% of the money in the Petroleum Fund and
the expected discounted future revenues, Asian Devel-
opment Bank 2015). This has been justified as part of a
front-loading strategy (i.e. an attempt to increase invest-
ment to encourage development); however, the govern-
ment faces challenges when it comes to delivering
investments with substantial economic returns. A key
example of this is the proposed Tasi Mane project,
which includes a seaport, airport and facilities for oil
and gas processing; this has been widely criticized
since it relies on the uncertain future development of
alternative oil deposits, namely the Greater Sunrise
oilfield and the processing of oil onshore in Timor-
Leste (with the latter more likely to take place in Austra-
lia, ConocoPhillips Australia 2016). In addition, discus-
sions on the most efficient way of investing revenues
from oil resources have exacerbated the differences
among political leaders. Drysdale (2007) reports that
Timor-Leste’s petroleum revenues were decided to be
invested entirely offshore to appease concerns about
political leaders investing in family businesses. Further-
more, there were few opportunities to invest revenues
in Timor-Leste, as industry and infrastructure were not
yet developed.
3. The resource curse in Timor-Leste – an in
Depth analysis of key mechanisms
This section critically analyses several key ‘resource curse’
mechanisms in the context of Timor-Leste. The analysis
aims to verify the presence (or absence) of resource-
curse type of phenomena and any measures in place
to mitigate them. Political explanations of the curse
often focus on conflict (Le Billon 2001), rent-seeking
behavior (Shaxson 2007) and the emergence of a
rentier state (Neves 2013), whilst economic channels
typically involve Dutch disease effects (Natural Resource
Governance Institute 2015), revenue volatility and declin-
ing terms of trade (Frankel 2012). Naturally, there is no
strict demarcation line across these two categories (and
across mechanisms), given that, in many cases, both
economic and political elements interact to generate
resource-curse conditions.
3.1. Political conditions
3.1.1. (Intra-group / inter-state) conflict
Timorese history is characterized by multiple periods of
internal and external conflict and tension – these
include the maritime boundary disputes between
Timor-Leste and Australia (going back to colonial days),
the Indonesian invasion and occupation, and the sub-
sequent violent resistance movement between 1975
and 1999. Post-independence, there have also been
shorter periods of violence and instability, including
extensive clashes in 2006 (and the 2008 unsuccessful
assassination attempts against the President José
Ramos-Horta and Prime-Minister Xanana Gusmão by
rebel soldiers). These tensions are linked to Timor-
Leste’s past (Portuguese colonization, Indonesian occu-
pation, the UN interim regime) and deep-rooted insti-
tutional weaknesses and grievances across different
groups. The presence of oil revenues more recently
simply intensified pre-existing tensions, especially in
relation to differences of opinion on how oil resources
should be used. In such a small country as Timor-Leste,
politics become ‘more intimate and contentious’
(Kammen 2019).
The intra-group conflict was largely fueled by the for-
mation of different interest groups with divergent priori-
ties. Already during the Portuguese colonization,
mestizos (largely children of Portuguese fathers and indi-
genous mothers) and educated natives living in towns
saw themselves as separate elite groups with interests
closely aligned with Portugal and its colonial adminis-
tration (Robinson 2010). They and original settlers were
the main beneficiaries of the limited education and
health care services provided under Portuguese rule
(while for the majority of the population, the colonization
period was one of overall neglect) (Kammen 2019). Since
the late 70s, supporters of the Indonesian rule antago-
nized the (pro-Portuguese, nationalist, communist)
opponents of the regime, generating social discord and
division (Robinson 2010). In the early 80s, extensive clan-
destine networks of civilians (both in rural and urban
areas) provided support (through supplies and shelter)
to anti-Indonesia communist sympathizers (Kammen
2019). It is worth noting that this intra-group conflict
has long-term historical roots in a divide-and-rule
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strategy adopted for many centuries by external powers.
Local militia groups have been successively mobilized by
Portuguese governors, the Japanese occupying forces
during the Second World War and the Indonesian
forces during occupation to fight against dissenting
elements and groups (Robinson 2010). During the
period under UN administration (1999–2002), East-
Timorese were side-lined within the transitional adminis-
trative structure, which favored the involvement of
foreign advisers (as a means to address Timor-Leste’s
lack of human capital, instead of investing in its own
people) (Kammen 2019). The previous Indonesian Gov-
ernment did exactly the same (with Indonesians
holding the majority of senior positions and few East
Timorese developing skills in government adminis-
tration) (Drysdale 2007). Even after independence in
2002, intra-group tensions persisted – the then President
Gusmão came at odds in several occasions with the par-
liament (vetoing several proposals, as in the case of the
2002 Bill on the Modification of the Tax System).
Indonesia’s annexation of Timor-Leste is often attribu-
ted to the fear that Timorese independence would
inspire other secessionist movements (Burr and Evans
2001). In addition, the brief civil war in mid-1975
between the forces aligned to the UDT (the Timorese
Democratic Union party) and Fretlin (the Revolutionary
Front party) political parties (initiated by the August
1975 coup by UDT) provided the motive behind the
Indonesian invasion later in the same year. Military
officers in Indonesia were fervently anti-communist
and, hence, much opposed even to a remote prospect
of Fretlin (with its communist inclinations) being in
charge of East Timor (Robinson 2010). Tacit international
support (notably by the US, Australia and the UK) left the
Indonesian invasion and claimed sovereignty in East
Timor rather unchallenged. Robinson (2010) claims that
the presence of offshore oil in East-Timor was an
additional (although less important) incentive behind
the annexation, in a period of ‘rapidly rising oil prices’
and given the ‘bankruptcy of Indonesia’s state oil
company, Pertamina’ early in 1975. It is also worth
noting that while Australia and Indonesia were negotiat-
ing their own maritime borders in the early 1970s, Portu-
gal (as the colonial power of East Timor) declined to
participate in the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea) negotiations to agree on the mar-
itime borders of the so-called Timor gap (the waters
between East Timor and Australia, where most oil
reserves are located, Ward 2014). When East Timor
became annexed in 1975, most of East Timor’s oil
reserves were placed inside Australian territory and
unsurprisingly Australia was one of the first countries
to recognize Indonesian’s annexation (The Independent
2004). Recently declassified documents reveal that Aus-
tralia’s commercial interests in oil were indeed influential
at the time (The Guardian 2018). This was echoed by Aus-
tralian diplomats, with Ambassador Richard Woolcott
suggesting that Indonesia was more open to striking a
deal on oil reserves than Portugal or an independent Por-
tuguese Timor. In the late 1980s, Indonesia and Australia
agreed to set up a joint zone of cooperation and split
equally any future oil revenues (Sýkora 2013). This tacit
support of an invasion and occupation appears to have
been, hence, rooted in Australia’s desire to acquire
access to significant deposits of oil (Burr and Evans 2001).
In September 1999, upon its exit from Timor-Leste,
Indonesian troops and pro-Indonesia militia groups
implemented a scorched-earth policy, in which 70% of
buildings were destroyed, alongside roads, water, electri-
cal infrastructure, and telecommunication equipment
(Kingsbury 2000). Robinson (2010) claims that the mobil-
ization of pro-Indonesia militia groups was part of stra-
tegic planning by state officials in East Timor and
Jakarta (who provided both funding and training). This
wave of violence was characterized by massive displace-
ment and significant destruction of public infrastructure
(Patricia, Leone, and Salardi 2014). The motives behind
are more likely to be related to Indonesia wishing to
prevent the further break-up of its vast archipelago
country and have little to do with the loss of petroleum
reserves (Crouch 2003). The Timor-Leste Strategic Devel-
opment Plan highlights that the Indonesian occupiers’
destruction of Timorese electrical infrastructure resulted
in an electricity sector that is still ‘inadequate, run down
and in urgent need of reform’ with latent effects in
Timor-Leste that still persist (Ministry of Finance 2011).
The damage extended beyond the destruction of phys-
ical infrastructure; the flight of Indonesian officials led
to a collapse of whatever state institutions were in
place (Kammen 2019).
Since independence in 2002, the East-Timor/Australia
dispute on their maritime borders continued driven by
disagreements on the division of revenues from the
Sunrise field. Australia continued acquiring half of the
accrued oil revenues from their joint zone and, even
more recently, with the 2018 Maritime Boundaries
Treaty, the agreed maritime boundaries (following the
median line between the two countries) will only come
into force in the far future after the commercial depletion
of the oil/gas reserves (Banks 2018).
With regard to Timor-Leste’s 2006 crisis, a 2006 USAID
report lists a large number of conflict triggers, the
majority of which have no direct connection to Timor-
Leste’s natural resources. Motives are associated with
pre-existing grievances already present during the
1975 civil war and during the Indonesian occupation.
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Many citizens were frustrated by the fact that the
material benefits of the (long-awaited) independence
were not materializing and also by the privileges of
many Fretlin supporters (who were for instance receiving
lucrative contracts for rice imports) (Kammen 2019). A cli-
entelist discriminatory use of government contracts was
also followed by subsequent administrations (e.g. by the
AMP – Parliamentary Majority Alliance – government
after 2007). The 2006 USAID report also mentions that
a greater awareness, that state resources (through oil
revenues) were growing, led many to believe that the
state was either corrupt or primarily focussed on retain-
ing control over the resources, rather than using them
for the benefit of the people. In 2006 (the year when
general violence took place), oil rents as a share of
total GDP reached their peak value at about 62% (with
oil dependence being negligible immediately after
dependence, rising to 45% in 2004 and gradually declin-
ing to 39% in 2009, 33% in 2012 and 15% in 2017) (World
Bank 2018). As Blunt (2009) puts it, government legiti-
macy in East Timor depended to a large extent on
whether ordinary people felt at large that they received
a fair share of the ‘fruits of independence’ in the form
of income accruing from oil and other national assets.
This climate of unrest and political instability had
immediate repercussions for the economy with domestic
investment falling to only 2% of GDP in 2006 and remain-
ing subdued for a long period of time (being less than
20% until 2016) (Ingram, Kent, and McWilliam 2015).
3.1.2. The rentier state and rent seeking behaviour
States which receive substantial amounts of unearned
income, e.g. in the form of royalties from resource extrac-
tion, are often referred to as rentier states. Luciani (1987,
134) summarizes the overarching problem with rentier
states as the fact that they do ‘not need to formulate any-
thing deserving the appellation of economic policy: all
[they] need is an expenditure policy’. Kammen (2019)
states that democratic processes and stability since the
achievement of independence in Timor-Leste was built
on ‘a ruling strategy of purchase’ (i.e. financial induce-
ments based on oil rents). While the oil-dependent
nature of Timor-Leste’s economy is likely to intensify
rent-seeking behavior and patronage-based systems of
governance, the country’s socio-political and historical
context suggests that a wide range of interacting
factors are at play. A good overview of these complex-
ities is discussed in a research paper by Peter Blunt
(2009). Portuguese colonialism was not conducive to
any economic growth process in the country and there
was a very limited effort to extend education to the
whole population of Timor-Leste; access to education
was a privilege only for Portuguese settlers and urban
elites and the literacy rate at the end of the Portuguese
rule was close to only 10% (Ingram, Kent, and McWilliam
2015). The historical legacy of the Indonesian occupation
was no better and created the later foundations of a
rather inefficient and non-transparent public adminis-
tration. The Indonesian administration strengthened
destructive informal institutions (as in the case of corrup-
tion practices) which were entrenched in Indonesia at
the time (Drysdale 2007). UNTAET – mobilized to deal
with the aftermath of Timor’s separation from Indonesia –
did not engage with the political history of the country
nor made any effort to address the corrosive relationship
between prominent leaders and their supporters.
Because of that, the three years of UNTAET inter-reign
did not manage to create a new political settlement in
the country (one that would rely more on tax than exter-
nal funding and set the foundations for an efficient
administration that would benefit the majority of the
population). The historical social fabric of the Timorese
society, where allegiances to ethnic groups, political
parties and other social groupings (e.g. military groups)
remain very strong, is also likely to have played an influ-
ential role in creating a patronage-based system of
public administration.
Various statistics suggests that Timor-Leste behaves
as a rentier state. Domestic revenues from taxation in
Timor-Leste are minimal compared to the non-tax pet-
roleum revenues; domestic tax revenues accounted for
8.5% of government revenues in 2018 (Ministry of
Finance 2018), which makes Timor-Leste the country
with the third-lowest total tax rate in the world
(Ingram, Kent, and McWilliam 2015). Nevertheless, this
is still an improvement compared to previous years; in
2009, for example, tax revenues made up only 2% of
total government revenues (Ministry of Finance 2011).
In 2009, the World Bank (2009) named Timor-Leste as
the top tax reformer, indicating that the administration
had managed to streamline its tax regime, cutting the
time taken to comply by 50%. Additionally, Molnar
(2015) claims that, during 2014, Timor-Leste signed a
number of agreements with foreign nations designed
to improve tax collection and policies. These are not
the actions of a state uninterested in generating
greater tax revenues. Despite these improvements,
however, momentum has slowed, with tax revenues
remaining low –while petroleum revenues fluctuate sub-
stantially based on oil market prices, non-petroleum tax
revenues have remained relatively stagnant in recent
years (approximately $199 million in 2016, $190 million
in 2017 and $189 million in 2018) – and while these
values are approximately twice as large compared to
the ones in 2009, projections for the near future signal
little hope of improvement with values close to $198
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million and $208 million for 2019 and 2020 respectively
(and as a matter of fact, the share of tax non-petroleum
revenues in overall government revenues has been
slightly falling since 2013) (Ministry of Finance 2018). In
general, we know that there is a general tendency of
oil-rich states to rely less on tax revenues (in relation to
mineral rents) for their public budget – rulers take advan-
tage of reduced income and sales taxes to appease the
public, which correspondingly demands less transpar-
ency and accountability (McFerson 2010). This general
pattern seems to be relevant also for the case of Timor-
Leste. Data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
of the World Bank (2019) based on firm, citizen and
expert perceptions on governance quality suggest that
over time there has been little improvement either
with respect to voice and accountability (i.e. regarding
the ability of citizens to participate actively in decision-
making and benefit by unhindered freedom of
expression and association, as well as free media) or
control of corruption (i.e. regarding constraints on
public power exercised for private gain) . Both indices
take values between −2.5 and 2.5 (with higher values
corresponding to better quality of governance) and in
the case of Timor-Leste they have remained consistently
low (in the case of voice and accountability, the index
increased only slightly from 0.06 in 2006 to 0.22 in
2016 with minor fluctuations in-between – similarly, in
the case of control of corruption, the index marginally
increased from −0.60 in 2006 to −0.54 in 2016). A 2013
survey of public servants revealed that more than a
third of all respondents witnessed corruption at their
workplace within the last year alone (Anti-Corruption
Commission 2013).
At the same time, there has been a particularly gener-
ous allocation of revenues towards public consumption
(e.g. in the form of transfers and wages) in Timor-Leste,
a common symptom of rentier states (Hamdan 2015).
While for all lower middle-income economies (the
group to which Timor-Leste also belongs), the average
share of government consumption in GDP ranged
between 10 and 11% since 2002, this has been consist-
ently higher in Timor-Leste (and increased from 13.5%
in 2005 to above 30% since 2015) (World Bank 2018).
Kammen (2019) mentions that just between 2010 and
2015 the number of employees in state-owned enter-
prises increased by more than 7.5 times. The opposite
holds for public investment – for example, close to the
2006 crisis, public investment only accounted for
approximately 1.5% of GDP, while the corresponding
figure was 6 times higher for all low middle income
countries as a whole. In the case of education, for
example, only between 7-10% of all government expen-
diture financed educational activities (while the
equivalent percentage has been consistently above
16% for the group of lower middle-income economies
as a whole). Similar trends are also observed in the
case of health – in comparison to the overall group of
low middle-income economies, Timor-Leste consistently
allocated a smaller share of its government budget to
health services since its independence (e.g. in 2007 the
corresponding figure was a meager 1.27% versus the cor-
responding 5.07% for all low middle income countries; in
2016 the equivalent figures were 3.22% and 5.5%
respectively). While again one cannot attribute excessive
public consumption (and reduced public investment) to
the resource curse, it is a typical feature of many petros-
tates to myopically underinvest their mineral rents and
instead redistribute them in the form of transfers to
specific interest groups. This does not imply that the gov-
ernment of Timor-Leste has not been generous with
respect to its government expenditure, but simply that
much of it was allocated towards short-term consump-
tion rather than investment. In 2013, for example,
overall direct transfers (for pensions to veterans,
support for the elderly and disabled, payments for
single mothers etc) accounted for about 20% of non-oil
GDP, while spending on road and electricity infrastruc-
ture projects for another 25%. In 2017, the transfers
increased to 23%, while the corresponding figure for
infrastructure development fell to 11% (Doraisami
2018). The World Bank raised questions regarding the
sustainability and poverty impact of the current public
spending schemes (Asia 2013). The World Bank links
this to rent-seeking motives, which we will discuss in
more detail below; the aim of veterans’ pensions, for
instance, may not be to reduce poverty, but to redistri-
bute resource rents to resistance members who have
managed to solidify their power and influence in post-
occupation Timor-Leste. Furthermore, Neves (2013)
suggests schemes, such as veterans’ payments, are key
to maintaining the state’s visibility outside of the
capital; rather than providing services or fostering econ-
omic success, the government relies on social transfers to
maintain their presence in rural areas, a certain sign of
the rentier state at work.
However, due to the enclave nature of its oil sector,
the state may not have much choice when it comes to
high levels of expenditure (this being one of the few
means to stimulate the economy). The oil sector is
largely disconnected to the wider domestic economy,
creating comparatively few jobs (with little potential to
reduce unemployment); linkages between the oil
sector and the rest of the economy are hence weak, pro-
viding very little in terms of a multiplier effect (Karl 2007).
This is confirmed to be the case for Timor-Leste by the
IMF, that concludes that ‘the [oil] sector directly accounts
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for virtually no on-shore employment’ and that ‘its econ-
omic impact is entirely via government spending’ (Leach
2016, 469). The latter of these statements is important;
the government must spend generously in order for
Timor-Leste’s oil resources to have any trickle-down
impact on the wider economy.
There some evidence suggesting that the Timorese
government has a scheme underway to bring oil jobs
onshore; as the private sector is lacking in the country,
the government has to take the lead when it comes to
stimulate investment. This is a move in the right direction
as long as other projects (of possibly higher rates of
return) also receive funding. As an example, the Tasi
Mane Project is made up of three clusters on the south
coast of Timor-Leste; a petroleum supply base, a petro-
chemical refinery and a Liquid Natural Gas plant (Ministry
of Finance 2011). Whilst a project on this scale could
provide significant numbers of jobs, it relies on the
future development of the Greater Sunrise oilfield and
the willingness of its operators to refine the extracted
material in Timor-Leste (Strating 2018). Local NGO La’o
Hamutuk (2013) claims that the Tasi Mane Project
received budget allocations from the Timorese Pet-
roleum Fund of around five times the combined
amount given to agriculture, fisheries, water and sani-
tation (approximately US$1.3 billion). Furthermore,
Scambary (2015) adds that no feasibility study has ana-
lysed the projected cost against the possible employ-
ment and financial returns. He also highlights that,
rather than being strategically placed for technical
reasons, the three hubs are spaced across a stretch of
the south coast (with no explanation thereby), hence
driving up costs.
A very similar case is represented by the Oecusse
special economic zone, which refers to the develop-
ment of a trade, commerce and tourist hub in the
enclave of Oecusse. The $4.11 billion public project
has been criticized for marginalizing the mountain-
dwelling and rural population through the loss of pro-
ductive agricultural land and risking depleting the
Timorese Petroleum Fund in case foreign investment
does not materialize (Doraisami 2018). The alternative
to these investments would be to shift the oil revenues
to Timor-Leste’s people, making heavy investment in
education, health and nutrition (Inder and Cornwall
2016). In view of this, in December 2015, the President
of Timor-Leste vetoed the 2016 state budget, based on
concerns that too much money is attributed to major
projects like Tasi Mane and the Oecusse special zone,
whilst criticizing that not enough is allocated to
health, education and agriculture; the parliament,
however, reconsidered the budget and decided unani-
mously not to make any changes (Bovensiepen 2016).
The project was also handed to the former Fretlin
Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and was seen as an implicit
attempt to buy off the political opposition (Kammen
2019).
The generous pension scheme to veterans is possibly
the most typical example of rent-seeking behavior taking
place within Timor-Leste’s oil economy. These are
awarded to those who took part in the resistance
struggle during Indonesian occupation, ranging from
$230 to $750 per month in 2014 (Doraisami 2018).
These sums are disproportionately large, when com-
pared to the average Timorese income (where over
40% of the population survived on below US$38 per
month, with the elderly and disabled receiving even
less (Kent and Wallis 2014). In non-oil GDP values,
veteran pensions accounted for 1.2% of GDP in 2009
and gradually increased to more than 4% by 2017 (Dor-
aisami 2018). It should also be noted that every Timorese
Prime Minister and President, both current and former,
was an active member of the resistance movement.
This suggests that members of the resistance movement
have been able to garner themselves positions of power
within Timor-Leste since independence, and the sub-
stantial pensions that other veterans receive are a
direct result of this. The Timorese Petroleum Fund has
also fallen victim of this rent-seeking behavior; as dis-
cussed in Section 2, actual withdrawals have since 2008
consistently exceeded their targeted Estimated Sustain-
able Income annual levels. Initially it was envisaged
that the parliament would provide consent to excessive
spending only infrequently (e.g. in periods of time
when the economy would have been in need of a stimu-
lus). However, the parliament has consistently abused its
power to legitimise excessive withdrawals – as a matter
of fact, while withdrawals were 25% above the allowed
ESI targets in 2009, they were twice as large in 2015,
and three times as large in 2018). Cash transfers (the
largest share of which is for pensions to veterans) are
supported by these excessive withdrawals and gradual
depletion of the Fund. In 2010, Prime Minister Gusmão
(from the Parliamentary Majority Alliance) responded to
criticism by opposition parties and civil society organiz-
ations by stating that a policy of savings is inappropriate
and attempted (unsuccessfully) to pass proposals that
would remove the need for parliamentary approval of
the state budget (Kammen 2019).
The IMF (2013) has been concerned that rent seeking
behavior potentially undermines long term growth.
Barma (2014) mentions that reports of rent seeking
around large-scale government investments are
common and Transparency International (2015) recently
highlighted a case, where the Minister of Finance Emilia
Pires signed a procurement document allocating a
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contract to a company owned and operated by her
husband. Evidently, Timor-Leste exhibits signs attributed
to rentier states. The Tasi Mane Project and veterans’
pensions appear targeted to maximize political benefit
rather than necessarily returns in terms of jobs, poverty
alleviation or economic development. Elite members
believe that they are entitled to a disproportionate
share of public resources; the state pays for elite
members to fly to overseas hospitals, whereas little
investments are made in the national health sector.
Roads and bridges in the capital city mostly used by
VIP visitors are frequently repaved, unlike those located
in rural communities (Ingram, Kent, and McWilliam 2015).
Overall, whilst there is evidence of rent-seeking
behavior, Timor-Leste has taken some steps to improve
transparency, especially with regard to the use of oil rev-
enues. Early steps were already undertaken by the
former Prime Minister Alkatiri who ordered a criminal
investigation which resulted in sixty-six cases of alleged
corruption between 2001 and 2005. Improvements can
be possibly attributed to some strong Timorese insti-
tutions in place. In particular, the Anti-Corruption Com-
mission (CAC) (which is believed to be independent
and fairly effective), has opened several investigations
regarding allegations of corruption, some of which
resulted in the conviction of high-ranked public
officials. This institution has, however, been the subject
of attacks by politicians, including the October 2014 ter-
mination of contracts of its international legal advisors
(Marx 2014). This fits well within Ross’s theory of rent
seizing, according to which elites often attempt to
weaken/dismantle institutions preventing them to
appropriate and distribute resource rents (Ross 2001).
3.2. Economic mechanisms
3.2.1. Dutch disease
Dutch disease (a term first coined by The Economist in
1977 (The Economist 1977), and subsequently theorized
by Corden and Neary (1982)), describes the situation
where a positive income shock (as in the case of an oil
boom) can reduce the competitiveness of exporting
sectors. Corden and Neary attribute this to two possible
effects: a real exchange rate appreciation (either as a
result of a rise in the nominal exchange rate or domestic
inflation; this is the so-called spending effect) and a shift
of production factors towards the booming resource
sector (as a result of wage and interest rate premia)
and away from other exporting activities (this is, the
so-called resource movement effect). Parts of these mech-
anisms are not relevant to the Timorese context,
however. The de facto currency of Timor-Leste is the
US dollar and, therefore, domestic factors (such as an
oil boom) cannot result in an appreciation of the real
exchange rate through a rise in the nominal exchange
rate. Second, the number of Timorese employed in the
oil sector is negligible, limiting, hence, the extent of a
‘resource movement’ from other productive activities
towards the extractive industry.
There is, however, some evidence suggesting that
Timor-Leste has not been entirely immune to the
Dutch disease. The manufacturing sector remains
small and has seen a falling trend since independence
(Rasiah, Vinanchiarachi, and Vadakkepat 2014); in 2000,
manufacturing contributed US$14 million to GDP at
constant prices, in 2013 this had fallen to US$8
million (Ministry of Finance 2015). It is evident that
the government has not done enough to diversify
the economy; the contribution of the services sector
to GDP fell from 54% in 2002 to 44% in 2017. The
manufacturing sector has consistently contributed less
than 1% of GDP since 2004 (while it was slightly
above 2% in 2002; when Timor-Leste gained its inde-
pendence). Lack of a skilled labor force together with
a small internal market have inhibited diversification
– in addition, while discussions on promoting diversifi-
cation focus on investing in agriculture and tourism,
budget allocations to these sectors have never
exceeded 10% of the state’s annual budget (da Cruz
Cardoso 2019). Whilst the aforementioned statistics
hint at the presence of Dutch disease, it is vital to
look for any causal linkages between the boom in
natural resource revenues and poor performance in
the manufacturing sector.
Between January 2010 and December 2014, Timor-
Leste’s consumer price index (CPI) rose from 100 to
121.3, with much of this increase taking place between
2011 and 2012 when inflation reached 10% (Asian Devel-
opment Bank 2015). By comparison, the average annual
inflation for other economies using the US Dollar as their
currency was 4.4% between 2011 and 2012. By 2017,
prices had increased by about 42% compared to 2010
(although the inflation has eased in more recent years,
being just over 2% in 2018). Additionally, the Timorese
Ministry of Finance found in its own analysis that recur-
rent government expenditure contributed to such high
levels of inflation. Considered alongside poor perform-
ance in the manufacturing sector, these statistics point
towards the presence of a spending effect (via inflation-
ary pressures and consecutive loss of competitiveness) in
Timor-Leste. Lundahl and Sjöholm (2009) highlight that
high prices and wages have been present from the
beginning of Timor-Leste’s period of independence,
suggesting that the influx of 15,000 expatriate workers
created an aid-driven urban economy with a high pur-
chasing power, resulting in a quadrupling of wages.
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Persistent competition across aid agencies was identified
as one of the primary causes of inflationary pressure on
Timorese wage levels (OECD 2010). High wages and
prices were therefore a symptom of a positive income
shock, initially driven by an influx of aid, and then
reinforced by excessive oil rents.
Evidence pointing to a ‘resource movement’ effect is
more difficult to identify. Only one comprehensive
survey of the Timor-Leste labor force has been con-
ducted, and therefore a time comparison of changes in
employment across sectors is not possible (Ministry of
Finance 2010). Capital reallocation to resource-based
exports also makes up part of the Dutch disease, and
there is evidence in support of this in Timor-Leste;
according to the most recently available budget for the
Timorese Petroleum Fund, the Tasi Mane petroleum
infrastructure project received almost five times the
amount awarded to agriculture and fishery infrastruc-
ture. Considering that coffee is Timor-Leste’s biggest
export after oil, this implies that other export industries
are being crowded out by the oil sector in Timor-Leste
(partly due to the resource movement effect).
The Timorese government’s initiative to set up the
Petroleum Fund in 2005 (see also Section 2) could
potentially provide a mitigating mechanism against
the Dutch Disease. The Fund is designed to dampen
domestic inflation in the prices of non-tradeables, by
discouraging excessive consumption (and instead favor-
ing investment both domestically and abroad) and,
hence, alleviating the impact of the ‘spending effect’
(McKechnie 2013). However, as we discussed in
Section 2, there has been little evidence of fiscal disci-
pline, with excessive withdrawals being the norm, mini-
mizing hence the ability of the fund to accumulate
wealth and stabilize prices (Ministry of Finance 2012).
Furthermore, increased expenditure from the Petroleum
Fund has greater inflationary consequences than
increased expenditure from other domestic revenues.
This is because in order to spend more from non-oil
domestic sources, the government would first have to
collect further revenues through taxation, an act
which is contractionary by nature.
3.2.2. Revenue volatility
Fluctuating oil prices and, as a consequence, volatile
revenues pose problems for long-term planning in
mineral-rich countries; they tend to encourage
increased spending when prices are high, which is
difficult to reduce when prices drop (Shaxson 2007).
Fortunately, in Timor-Leste, the government relies on
conservative estimates for future oil revenues based
on the average values of the US Energy Information
Administration (EIA) low-case and reference-case
scenarios (Ministry of Finance 2013). As a result of this
precautionary approach, the government budget
(between 2009 and 2015) was based on forecasts
below what the actual oil price turned out to be in six
out of seven years (Ministry of Finance 2012, 2013,
2014). This does not suggest, by any means, that the
government did not spend generously (as we discussed
earlier on), but that, at least, its expectations regarding
future oil revenues were realistic. 2015 was an atypical
year, during which the even conservative estimate for
the average oil price (per barrel) proved to be largely
optimistic (exceeding the actual oil price by over US
$35, see Ministry of Finance 2015). In cases like this, for-
tunately, the Petroleum Fund acts as a stabilizing mech-
anism that offers additional liquidity to compensate for
the unpredictably low commodity prices (Kern 2007).
However, as we discussed earlier on, the long-term via-
bility of such a stabilizing mechanism has been jeopar-
dized by an overexploitation of the Petroleum Fund in
recent years (which will only be aggravated in the
future as oil rents entering the Fund are projected to
fall). Whilst the financial management of the Fund is
far from ideal (a fact which one could interpret as a
symptom of the resource curse), it certainly helps to
mitigate the volatility that fluctuating oil prices can
induce on the real economy.
5. Conclusion
The overarching conclusion that has surfaced from our
analysis is that Timor-Leste has not been immune to
the ‘resource curse’. Several of the typical resource
curse mechanisms seem to be at play. Many of these
socio-economic problems are attributed to a wide array
of historical and political factors that, in effect, precede
the discovery and extraction of oil. While it might be
tempting to attribute these problems to mineral discov-
eries and related income shocks, careful examination
suggests that the extractive sector aggravates pre-exist-
ing problems than necessarily causes them. In the case of
conflict, whilst the presence of oil was not the catalyzing
factor behind it, it is likely to have provided a motivation,
both for Australia to support the Indonesian invasion and
later departure, and for some Timorese people to push
back against the government in 2006. Rent seeking
behavior has also been prevalent, as exemplified in the
case of generous veterans’ pensions, which receive a dis-
proportionately large budget allocation. At large, Timor-
Leste appears to be a prime example of a rentier state –
state-owned enterprises abound, the tax base and there-
fore government accountability remain minimal and
there is large public expenditure on inefficient transfers
(as well as expensive schemes with political benefits
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but with little development potential). There is evidence
of a Dutch disease through both the spending and
resource movement effects, but this has been somewhat
limited by the use of the US Dollar as currency. In
addition, while the use of a Petroleum Fund has substan-
tially reduced revenue volatility, the government has
consistently fallen into the trap of overzealous expendi-
ture funded through excessive withdrawals when
prices are high.
As already alluded to, several factors have been ident-
ified which can help mitigate the impact of the resource
curse (e.g. anti-corruption institutions, the dollarised
economy and the Petroleum Fund). Due to government
action, however, in both weakening local institutions and
persistently over-exploiting the Petroleum Fund, the
mitigating nature of such protective mechanisms has
been reduced. Our study is one of the first research
endeavours dedicated to critically examine the develop-
ment effects of mineral resource management in Timor-
Leste. Future research can probe into each of the
resource curse mechanisms we discussed in greater
detail – this will help in formulating evidence-based
policy recommendations that can alter the Timorese
government’s perspective and ensure the best possible
use of Timor-Leste’s resource endowments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
References
Andersen, Jørgen J., and Silje Aslaksen. 2013. “Oil and Political
Survival.” Journal of Development Economics 100 (1): 89–106.
Anti-Corruption Commission. 2013. Integrity Survey of Public
Servants in Timor-Leste. Dili, Timor-Leste. http://cac.tl/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/Public-Servant-Integrity-Survey.pdf.
World Bank. 2013. Timor-Leste Social Assistance Public
Expenditure and Program Performance Report. Washington,
DC: World Bank.
Asian Development Bank. 2015. Growing the Non-Oil Economy:
A Private Sector Assessment for Timor-Leste. Mandaluyong
City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank.
Auty, Richard. 1993. Sustaining Development in Mineral
Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. Abingdon, UK:
Routledge.
Baggio, Jacopo, and Elissaios Papyrakis. 2010. “Ethnic Diversity,
Property Rights and Natural Resources.” The Developing
Economies 48 (4): 473–495.
Banks, Nigel. 2018. “Settling the Maritime Boundaries between
Timor-Leste and Australia in the Timor Sea.” The Journal of
World Energy Law & Business 11 (5): 387–409.
Barma, Naazneen H. 2014. “The Rentier State at Work:
Comparative Experiences of the Resource Curse in East
Asia and the Pacific.” Asia and the Pacific Studies 1 (2): 257–
272.
Blunt, Peter. 2009. “The Political Economy of Accountability in
Timor-Leste: Implications for Public Policy.” Public
Administration and Development 29 (2): 92–98.
Bovensiepen, Judith. 2016. “Visions of Prosperity and
Conspiracy in Timor-Leste.” Focaal 2016: 75–88.
Burr, William, and Michael L Evans. 2001. East Timor: Ford,
Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, 1975–76. NSA
Electronic Briefing Book No. 62. Washington, DC: National
Security Archive.
Cavalcanti, Tiago V., Kamiar Mohaddes, and Mehdi Raissi. 2011.
“Growth, Development and Natural Resources: New
Evidence Using a Heterogeneous Panel Analysis.” The
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 51 (4): 305–318.
Central Bank of Timor-Leste. 2016. PetroleumFundofTimor-Leste.
Dili, Timor-Leste. https://www.bancocentral.tl/PF/main.asp.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2005. “Resource Rents,
Governance and Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49
(4): 625–633.
ConocoPhillips Australia. 2016. Greater Sunrise. Accessed 8
March, 2016. http://www.conocophillips.com.au/our-
business-activities/our-projects/Pages/GreaterSunrise.aspx.
Corden, Max W., and Peter J Neary. 1982. “Booming Sector and
De-Industrialisation in a Small Open Economy.” The Economic
Journal 92 (368): 825–848.
Crouch, Harold. 2003. “The TNI and East Timor Policy.” In Out of
the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor,
edited by James Fox, and Dionisio Babo Soares, 141–167.
Canberra, Australia: ANU Press.
da Cruz Cardoso, Joao. 2019. “Can Timor-Leste Move Away from
an Oil-Based Economy?.” The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.
com/2019/03/can-timor-leste-move-away-from-an-oil-
based-economy/.
de Magalhaes, Barbedo A. 1992. East Timor Indonesian
Occupation and Genocide. Porto, Portugal: Oporto
University Press.
Doraisami, Anita. 2018. “The Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund,
Veterans and White Elephants: Fostering Intergenerational
Equity?” Resources Policy 58: 250–256.
Drysdale, Jennifer. 2007. “Sustainable Development or Resource
Cursed? An Exploration of Timor-Leste’s Institutional
Choices.” PhD dissertation, Australian National University.
The Economist. 1977. The Dutch Disease. 26 November 1977:
82–83.
Frankel, Jeffrey. 2012. The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of
Diagnoses and Some Prescriptions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Kennedy School.
The Guardian. 2018. Oil and Gas Had Hidden Role in Australia’s




Hamdan, Fadi. 2015. “Intensive and Extensive Disaster Risk
Drivers and Interactions with Recent Trends in the Global
Political Economy, with Special Emphasis on Rentier
States.” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 14
(3): 273–289.
Hamutuk, La’o. 2013. Infrastructure Fund Allocations 2011-2017.
Dili, Timor-Leste. http://www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE13/
InfraPie20112017en.gif.
Hodler, Roland. 2006. “The Curse of Natural Resources in
Fractionalized Countries.” European Economic Review 50 (6):
1367–1386.
150 S. JOHN ET AL.
IMF. 2013. Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste: Article IV
Consultation Staff Report. IMF Country Report No.13/338.
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
The Independent. 2004. Australia Casts a Shadow Over East




Inder, Brett, and Kate Cornwall. 2016. Private Sector-Driven
Development in an Infant Economy. Research Paper Series on
Timor-Leste RP-TL4-English. Clayton, Australia: Monash
University.
Ingram, Sue, Lia Kent, and Andrew McWilliam. 2015. New Era?:
Timor-Leste After the UN. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press.
Kammen, Douglas. 2019. Independent Timor-Leste: Between
Coercion and Consent. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Karl, Terry L. 2007. Oil-led Development: Social, Political, and
Economic Consequences. CDDRL Working Papers No. 80.
Stanford, CA: CDDRL, Stanford University.
Kent, Lia, and Joanne Wallis. 2014. Timor-Leste’s Veterans’
Pension Scheme: Who are the Beneficiaries and Who is
Missing Out? State, Society & Governance in Melanesia
Program (SSGM), In Brief 2014/13. Canberra, Australia:
Australian National University.
Kern, Steffen. 2007. Sovereign Wealth Funds – State Investments
on the Rise. Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bank Research.
http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/
PROD0000000000215270.pdf.
Kingsbury, Damien. 2000. “Conclusion.” In Guns and Ballot
Boxes: East Timor’s Vote for Independence, edited by
Damien Kingsbury, 185–188. Caulfield East, Australia:
Monash Asia Institute.
Le Billon, Philippe. 2001. “The Political Ecology of War: Natural
Resources and Armed Conflicts.” Political Geography 20 (5):
561–584.
Leach, Michael. 2016. “Timor-Leste.” Contemporary Pacific 28 (2):
469–478.
Luciani, Giacomo. 1987. “Allocation vs. production States: A
Theoretical Framework.” In The Rentier State: Nation, State
and Integration in the Arab World, edited by Hazem A.
Beblawi, and Giacomo Luciani, 75–91. London, UK: Croom
Helm.
Lundahl, Mats, and Fredrik Sjöholm. 2009. “Population Growth
and Job Creation in Timor-Leste.” Journal of the Asia Pacific
Economy 14 (1): 90–104.
Marx, Susan. 2014. Firing of Foreign Judges in Timor-Leste
Threatens Justice System. Dili, East Timor: Asia Foundation.
http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2014/10/29/firing-of-
foreign-judges-in-timor-leste-threatens-justice-system/.
McFerson, Hazel M. 2010. “Extractive Industries and African
Democracy: Can the ‘Resource Curse’ be Exorcised?”
International Studies Perspectives 11 (4): 335–353.
McKechnie, Alastair. 2013.Managing Natural Resource Revenues:
The Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund. London: Overseas
Development Institute.
Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik. 2006.
“Institutions and the Resource Curse.” The Economic Journal
116 (508): 1–20.
Ministry of Finance. 2010. Timor-Leste Labour Force Survey 2010.
Dili, Timor-Leste.
Ministry of Finance. 2011. Timor-Leste Strategic Development
Plan 2011–2030. Dili, Timor-Leste.
Ministry of Finance. 2012. State Budget 2013. Budget Overview:
Book 1. Dili, Timor-Leste.
Ministry of Finance. 2013. State Budget 2014. Budget Overview:
Book 1. Dili, Timor-Leste.
Ministry of Finance. 2014. State Budget 2015. Budget Overview:
Book 1. Dili, Timor-Leste.
Ministry of Finance. 2015. Timor-Leste National Accounts 2000–
2013, General Directorate of Statistics. Dili, Timor-Leste.
Ministry of Finance. 2017. Petroleum Fund Annual Report.
Financial Year 2017. Dili, Timor-Leste. https://www.mof.gov.
tl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/PF-FINAL-REPORT-2017.pdf.
Ministry of Finance. 2018. Timor-Leste National Accounts 2000–
2017. General Directorate of Statistics (Dili, Timor-Leste,
2015), p. XI. RDTL MoF, ‘State budget: Approved 2019.
Budget overview: Book 1’, (Dili, Timor-Leste, 2018).
Molnar, Andrea K. 2010. Timor-Leste: Politics, History, and Culture.
Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
Molnar, Andrea K. 2015. “Timor-Leste in 2014: Anxiety Over the
Future After Gusmao.” Asian Survey 55 (1): 228–234.
Natural Resource Governance Institute. 2015. TheResourceCurse:
ThePoliticalandEconomicChallengesofNaturalResourceWealth.
New York: Natural Resource Governance Institute.
Neves, Guteraino N.S. 2013. “Timor-Leste: The Political Economy
of a Rentier State.” Proceedings of the Understanding Timor-
Leste Conference, Dili, Timor-Leste.
OECD. 2010. Monitoring the Principles for Good International
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Country Report
6: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Paris: Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development.
Østby, Gudrun, Ragnhild Nordås, and Jan Rød. 2009. “Regional
Inequalities and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
International Studies Quarterly 53 (2): 301–324.
Patricia, Justino, Marinella Leone, and Paola Salardi. 2014.
“Short-and Long-Term Impact of Violence on Education:
The Case of Timor Leste.” The World Bank Economic Review
28 (2): 320–353.
Rasiah, Rajah, Jebamalai Vinanchiarachi, and Padmanand
Vadakkepat. 2014. “Catching-Up From Way Behind: How
Timor-Leste Can Avoid the Dutch Disease.” Institutions and
Economies 6 (1): 119–148.
Robinson, Geoffrey. 2010. If You Leave Us Here, we Will Die: How
Genocide was Stopped in East Timor. Princenton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Ross, Michael. 2001. “Does oil Hinder Democracy?”World Politics
53 (3): 325–361.
Scambary, James. 2015. “In Search of White Elephants: The
Political Economy of Resource Curse Income Expenditure in
East Timor.” Critical Asian Studies 47 (2): 283–308.
Shaxson, Nicholas. 2007. “Oil, Corruption and the Resource
Curse.” International Affairs 83 (6): 1123–1140.
Strating, Rebecca. 2018. “Timor-Leste in 2017: A State of
Uncertainty.” Southeast Asian Affairs 2018 (1): 391–404.
Sýkora, Jiří. 2013. “Oil in Timor-Leste: A Ticket to Prosperity?”
Acta Oeconomica Pragensia 21 (3): 68–85.
Transparency International. 2015. Timor-Leste: Overview of




DEVELOPMENT STUDIES RESEARCH 151
Ward, Christopher. 2014. “The Maritime Boundaries of East
Timor: The Role of International Law.” Proceedings of the
NorthernTerritoryBarassociationConference,Dili, Timor-Leste.
World Bank. 2009. Tax Reform Remains on the Agenda of
Governments Despite Economic Downturn. Press release.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2018. World Development Indicators. Washington,
DC: World Bank. http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-
development-indicators.
World Bank. 2019. World Governance Indicators. Washington,
DC: World Bank. https://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home.
152 S. JOHN ET AL.
